This paper describes shelter and related deprivations that poor migrants to Surabaya, Indonesia, endure. Surabaya is renowned as the pioneer of the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP)-a type of citywide slum upgrading, an effective pro-poor shelter intervention. Although Surabaya has ostensibly embraced inclusive planning and governance, this paper argues it still unjustly burdens poor migrants with policies that are exclusionary and iniquitous. Qualitative evidence from a decade of field research in Surabaya points out that shelter accessibility discriminates between its eligible and ineligible poor, that is, the city's so-called citizens and outsiders. It posits that Surabaya's contemporary shelter interventions comprises two phases, KIP and post-KIP. Extensive settlement upgrading marked the pre-decentralization KIP-phase. After decentralization in 1999, the post-KIP phase saw the city prioritize rental flats for the poor. Curiously, it is because of the KIP-phase, which did not address housing per se, that Surabaya's migrants still find affordable shelter. The post-KIP phase has done little to alleviate the shelter woes of the city's poor migrants despite their demonstrated potential to produce sustainable and inclusive alternatives. The analysis suggests that political will and civil society participation can alter the shelter status quo of Surabaya's migrant poor. 
Introduction
Urbanization's distinguishing features have been the massive demographic shift and restructuring of the labour sector-from villages to cities, and from agriculture to manufacturing, respectively (Davis, 1965) . Inseparable from urbanization, migration is now its firmest driver. Despite migration's nonpareil significance, urban policies have yet to accord it serious attention. Even planning theory's engagement with the urban migrant is relatively recent. Most cities in developing countries render the migrant invisible. This paper probes shelter-related deprivations that poor migrants in Surabaya, Indonesia, endure. The New Urban Agenda (NUA) sets global standards of achievement for sustainable and inclusive urban development. Interestingly, the NUA's final draft (July 2016) emerged at the Third Preparatory Committee Meeting for Habitat III (PrepCom3) in Surabaya. Urbanization and migration make urban economies robust and societies diverse, but also produce spatial, organizational, ecological, political and social challenges. Because of strong economic growth in recent decades, urban Asia experienced the highest increase in urbanization during 1990-2010 and now houses over half of the world's urban population (UN-HABITAT, 2010) . However, the relative growth in urban poverty has been even faster, and urban inequality and housing deprivation have worsened in most Asian cities (Mathur, 2013) . Poverty is briskly becoming urbanized and the number of extremely poor urban dwellers has been increasing. A third of Asia's urban population still resides in slums (UN-HABITAT, 2010); most are migrants facing multiple vulnerabilities (Tacoli, McGranahan, & Satterthwaite, 2015) .
Surabaya pioneered the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), an effective pro-poor urban slum upgrading innovation. Although the city claims inclusive planning and governance, this paper argues that it unjustly burdens poor migrants with exclusionary and iniquitous policies. The paper posits two phases of its contemporary shelter interventions-KIP and post-KIP. In the latter, the city comprehensively shifted priority from upgrading to producing affordable flats. Curiously, because of the KIP-phase poor migrants still find affordable shelter, while current efforts do not alleviate their shelter deprivations. For making Surabaya's shelter policies more inclusive, political will and civil society participation are essential.
Since 2005 the author has conducted mixed methods research on post-decentralization urban upgrading in Surabaya, focusing on community participation and empowerment, community-managed integrated microfinance led by community-based organizations (CBOs), as well as local affordable housing. This paper draws upon evidence from this longitudinal engagement with Surabaya as well as qualitative field research conducted during July-August 2016. The latter involved semi-structured interviews, openended conversations, transect walks through squatter settlements and housing projects, photographs and exploring sundry documents. The semi-structured interviews quizzed 10 key informants-legal residents, informal sector migrants, representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) and academics. In over a dozen trips to Surabaya spanning over a decade, I have lived almost a year in three low-income traditional neighbourhoods (kampung). It enabled me to observe and follow the lives of several individuals and families over time. Some of them are key informants for this research. I embed the narrative with some quick ethnographic 'vignettes' of their life experiences as illustrative case materials that build the larger narrative from 'inside out' (Yin, 2011, p. 260) . The paper comprises seven sections: introduction; literature review; background; overviews of the KIP and post-KIP phases; analysis of shelter, livelihoods and legality; and conclusions.
Migrants, Informality and the Right to the City
The twenty-first-century city's challenges will be unprecedented because of the rapid urbanization of low-income countries, and the rising shares of urban poverty and migrants (Beard, Mahendra, & Westphal, 2016) . Migration has various triggers and shapers-inter alia uneven economic development to various types of violence to environmental factors. Economists' models have tried since the 1950s to explain rural-urban migration. Notably, the Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro models' (Harris & Todaro, 1970) claims that rural-to-urban migration exacerbates urban employment still influence governments to implement policies that restrict internal migration. In fact, such misguided policies have sharply increased since the 1990s (Fox, 2014) . Although the empirical validity of the Todaro and Harris-Todaro models have been widely challenged, yet how government policies should intervene and for what objectives are hardly any clearer today (Lall, Selod, & Shalizi, 2006) .
In developing countries rural-urban migration is commonly blamed for deepening urban poverty and spreading labour and shelter informality. However, they also stem from deleteriously intensifying globalization and neoliberalism (Kundu & Kundu, 2010) . Liberalized flows of capital, relaxed development controls and retrenchment of public expenditures and services have accelerated megaprojects, displacements and peri-urbanization (Shatkin, 2016) , and hindered pro-poor efforts by making employment precarious, services scarcer and housing dearer (Rolnik, 2014) . Large-scale privatized urban development has heightened informality, disaster risk (Rumbach, 2014) and violent contestations over space (Bhan, 2009; Peters, 2009) . Moreover, an entrenched urban-rural policy dichotomy ignores the often dynamic, cyclical and interdependent nature of rural-urban linkages (Tacoli et al., 2015) . Sietchiping, Kago, Zhang, Augustinus and Tuts (2014) stress that the state should promote multi-stakeholder partnerships and sensitively include displaced persons and migrants for sustainable urbanization.
A country urbanizes the most in its early development stage, when the capacity to provide decent jobs, services and infrastructure is the weakest (World Bank, 2008) , and which sprouts informal settlements and slums. But flawed notions of urbanization dynamics cause policymakers to ignore or trivialize migration's contribution to urban economies, whereas elite hegemony over planning institutions admonishes informality (Roy, 2005) and conveniently but disingenuously deems it the root of many urban problems. Since government initiatives like Indonesia's transmigrasi programme have caused massive forced migrations (Fearnside, 1997) , Satterthwaite (2005) aptly captures the paradox: '… city governments have adopted market-led policies, but refuse to accept market-led population movements ' (p. 22) .
Deeming poor migrants illegal is unjust, and depriving them of welfare benefits and services unwise. Denying proof of belonging and not producing data on squatters and their settlements renders millions of city dwellers invisible in plain sight shunning CSOs that struggle on their behalf abets such exclusionary governmentality (Appadurai, 2001 ). China's infamous efforts to restrict and regulate the largest urban migration ever using the hukou (a household registration system that restricts access to subsidized health and education services to one's place of birth) spawned egregious spatial and social injustices (Chan, 2009; Connelly & Maurer-Fazio, 2016) . Migration is often circular and seasonal (Tacoli et al., 2015) , and it rarely privileges the poorest. It is often triggered by ill-planned formal expansion into the hinterland that blurs the urban-rural dichotomy. Shelter policies widely shun squatter settlements despite strong evidence favouring in situ slum upgrading and innovative property rights (Birch, Chattaraj, & Wachter, 2016; Das, 2016) . Birch et al. (2016) denounce the formal-informal dichotomy as false because state policies and market forces create informal settlements, which actually provide affordable rental options for poor migrants (Naik, 2015) .
Planning now recognizes its responsibility to include the most marginalized inhabitants. Concepts like the 'right to the city' (Harvey, 2008) and the 'just city' (Fainstein, 2010) have decried neoliberalism's eroding of the city's publicness and inclusivity. In the rapidly urbanizing global South, with distinct urban complexities and institutions, unique planning epistemologies centred on informality are imperative (Robinson & Roy, 2015) . Transnational grassroots civil society movements with strong constituent bases and sophisticated advocacy arsenal embody such epistemological shifts. Strong local political will and vision can realize radical, progressive innovations in lieu of evictions (du Plesis, 2005)-for example, legally recognizing the homeless as 'citizens' in Delhi (Suryanarayan, 2014) , squatters designing shelter in Bangkok's Baan Mankong programme (Das, 2016) , or supporting street vending in Solo, Indonesia (Rukmana, 2011) . New governance arrangements involving civil society actors can catalyze the political and social restructuring necessary for inclusivity (Das & Takahashi, 2009 ).
Surabaya: The Setting
Located on Java's eastern tip, Surabaya is Indonesia's second largest city with an area of 326.8 km 2 . As an historic port, it has long been an arrival city for traders, travelers and migrants, which made it the main urban hub for eastern Indonesia (Dick, 2002) . During President Suharto's authoritarian regime called the New Order , it transformed into an industrial city. Since the 1980s, both informal (including petty trade) and formal services, and manufacturing replaced agriculture as the main employer (Dick, 2002; Peters, 2013) . About 20 major universities and scores of smaller polytechnics attract students from near and far.
Java is Indonesia's most urbanized island with eight of the archipelago's 10 largest cities-besides Surabaya and Bandung (the third largest), the other six constitute the Jakarta megapolitan region. Medan (fourth, with 2.5 million) and Palembang (ninth, with 1.6 million), both on Sumatra, the only top-10 are cities not on Java. A recent study found that Java and Bali account for almost 70 per cent of Indonesia's urban population (World Bank, 2012) . It identified, besides Jakarta and Surabaya, four metropolitan regions with 5-10 million population (all on Java), 13 with 1-5 million and eight with 0.5-1 million. Altogether the urban areas generate about 60 per cent of the national economy, but economic output is disproportionately concentrated in the large urban agglomerations of Jakarta and the Java-Bali regions, more broadly. The economies of the 10 largest agglomerations grew 1 at an annual rate almost 10 per cent more than the other areas (World Bank, 2012, p. 38) .
Whereas Jakarta's primate urban region, Jabodetabekjur, today houses an estimated 30 million residents (www.bps.go.id), Surabaya's population stabilized around 3 million between 2000 and 2010. In 2010, the metropolitan region of Surabaya, Gerbangkertosusila, comprising six surrounding regencies, had a population over 9 million. Surabaya comprises 31 districts (kecamatan) and 163 sub-districts (kelurahan). Indonesia's administrative structure penetrates down to the neighbourhood level; each kelurahan is further divided into denizens' associations (rukun warga, RW) and neighbours' associations (rukun tetangga, RT), of which now there are now 1,405 and 9,271, respectively (http://dispendukcapil. surabaya.go.id).
The city's inhabitants are predominantly Javanese and Muslim (about 85 per cent each) (www.bps. go.id). Christians, mostly Chinese Indonesians, the next largest group by religion, constitute 13 per cent of the population. An estimated 10-15 per cent is from the neighbouring island of Madura. Many Maduranese, the largest migrant group, are poor, work informally and draw negative stereotypes. Table 1 presents some insightful local statistics. Data on squatter settlements and the informal sector are grossly lacking and suspect in quality (Das, 2016) . Officially, the proportion living in poverty has steadily declined to under 6 per cent now-the accrued dividend of decades of upgrading and recent health and education expansion initiatives. Yet, a rising human development index (HDI) is tempered by growing inequality (0.4 Gini coefficient). The city has continued to raise the poverty line for determining welfare eligibility, but it is barely above a dollar a day.
Natural births have increased every year except in 2014, but in 2010 too Surabaya experienced a net decrease in population; the fluctuating population suggests circular migration. In 2011, the proportion of in-migration (20 per cent) to overall population increase was less than that of natural population increase (25 per cent), but it became fourfold of the latter in 2012 and about 50 per cent more in 2013. But data are quite likely underreported. Also, the figures for net in-migration and natural population increase do not add up to net annual population change (rows for [J] , [F] , and [B], respectively). Data are also A KTP is a government-issued card (process explained later), the application for which needs to be submitted within 14 days of a person turning 17 years of age, marriage or moving to reside in a new city (with documents such as the letter of intent to reside, report of move by new migrant [SKPPB] , family card and birth certificate). The traditional KTP carries the following information: an identification number (NIK); picture; full name; date and place of birth; gender; religion; marital status; address; occupation; expiry date; place and date of issue; bearer's signature and name and signature of issuing officer. In 2011, the government began issuing the non-expiring e-KTP (electronic) with a microchip for biometric information. The KTP is required for obtaining all other official documents-for example, passport, driving license, taxpayer identification number (NPWP), insurance policies, land and property documents and marriage certificate.
The Era of KIP
Until the 1970s, demolitions and evictions of squatter settlements were commonplace in the new postcolonial states (Sumka, 1987) . John Turner's reproach of evictions and lionizing of self-help housing (Turner & Fichter, 1972) and the success of the KIP-an Indonesian in situ upgrading innovation-the World Bank aggressively promoted sites-and-services and upgrading programmes. Contemporary lowincome shelter policies in Indonesia facilitate settlement upgrading, public housing, land provision and housing finance. But scarce political will, weak state capacity, underdeveloped housing finance, complicated regulations and chaotic land management have rendered them ineffective (Tunas & Darmoyono, 2014) . Public housing's modest targets have remained unmet, and mostly served the middle classes (Das, 2016; Silas, 1987) . Thus, for the poor self-help is still the only feasible housing option (Tunas & Darmoyono, 2014) . Despite scant policy support for it, housing in the ubiquitous kampung has sheltered the urban poor.
KIP was simultaneously pioneered by Jakarta and Surabaya in 1969. Surabaya sustained a series of KIP variants over three decades (Swanendri, 2002) , owing much to a unique synergy that emerged between the city and the LPP 2 -a housing settlements and design research centre at a local university (ITS) led by a charismatic architect-planner, Johan Silas. By 1998, with steadily increasing community participation, Surabaya upgraded nearly all poor kampung. Implemented nationwide in top-down fashion, KIPs precipitously lowered urban poverty, but cost recovery, maintenance, conflict resolution and civil society participation were unsatisfactory (World Bank, 1995) .
KIP is widely understood as slum upgrading, while the term 'slum' conjures up images of 'illegal' squatter settlements. However, in Surabaya (and elsewhere), KIPs rarely improved squatted upon settlements deemed illegal. The word kampung implies mixed-use traditional neighbourhoods that predate modern city planning. Post-independence, Surabaya was a collage of planned neighbourhoods and spontaneously evolved kampung that kept extending into the agricultural periphery. Poverty was distributed unevenly across kampung, but pockets of indigence prevailed in all. Few kampung were too dense in the 1960s; even today open spaces exist in peripheral ones.
Suarbaya's KIPs transformed these poor neighbourhoods, which also always housed renters, and raised their property values by legitimizing tenure (pemutihan) (Peters, 2010) . The resulting sense of security motivated even those without proper documentation to improve their structures. Lacking proof of property ownership or contentious claims did not prevent KIP upgrading, which enabled remarkable scaling-up. What made it possible? Although Indonesia had no affordable housing programme, KIPs focused on community-level infrastructure and did not target individual home improvement. This prevented upgrading's building standardization trap that impeded affordability and abetted gentrification elsewhere (Gulyani & Bassett, 2007 ).
Indonesia's complex property rights system-a mix of western, individual and customary, collective ones-is also flexible (Leaf, 1993) . The state implicitly administers customary use and possession rights through its bottom-level administrators-the camat (district heads) and lurah (sub-district heads), with the Pak RW (town association heads) (Struyk, Hoffman, & Katsura, 1990, p. 369) . Previously, the notion of customary rights justified much informal land transaction and building construction in kampung, which the camat and lurah legitimized by collecting land and building taxes. The ensuing sense of security has fueled incremental shelter improvements that keep Indonesia's housing markets fairly affordable for the urban poor (Monkkonen, 2013) .
Even the kampung is not always affordable for the poorest migrants-such as scavengers, laborers, vendors, pedicab drivers and metalsmiths. Social prejudices also hinder their inclusion. So they squat along waterways and railway tracks, under bridges, and on wetlands forming informal settlements. A civil society activist estimates squatters to number 200,000-300,000 in Surabaya. 3 In the 1970s, although building a simple shelter was affordable, housing and economic mobility for squatters were negligible because the city vigorously eradicated squatter settlements and lacked interest to improve housing (McCutcheon, 1984, p. 370 ). Today's squatters have better economic prospects, but the specter of demolitions still looms large.
The Post-KIP Phase
Indonesia transmogrified in the late 1990s. A politically restive atmosphere following the devastating Asian financial crisis of 1996-1997 precipitated the fall of the New Order in 1998. The country did an existential volte face by its sudden democratization and decentralization. That same year, with newfound autonomy, the city and LPP initiated the Comprehensive KIP (CKIP). A wholly community-led effort, CKIP prioritized community economic development through kelurahan level, CBO-operated microfinance; 70 per cent of programme funds were devoted to supporting poor entrepreneurs (Das, 2015b) . Its closure in 2008 ended nearly three decades of uninterrupted urban upgrading in Surabaya.
Despite CKIP's autonomy, its potential remained unmet and it too sustained exclusion because of (Das, 2015a (Das, , 2015b : the city and LPP's latent bias against 'illegal' residents; poor targeting of beneficiaries; weak participation by CSOs (that could have altered the status quo) and strict accountability pressures on fledgling CBOs. CKIP was supposed to extend credit to those lacking access to Indonesia's large microcredit sector. But since CKIP too lent mostly to those with KTP, credit eluded many of the poorest, especially migrants. Assurances from the lurah and Pak RW let some CBOs lend without KTP, but only to residents, never migrants.
With upgrading all but stopped, Surabaya's pro-poor shelter emphasis has weakened (Das, 2016) . The only such intervention now is rental walk-up flats (rusunawa); 4 yet, only 13 projects (~3,500 units) have materialized. Funded by Perumnas's (National Housing Advisory Board) 1,000 Towers programme or the provincial government, the city provides land but not funding under this arrangement. Relinquishing its shelter spending is clearly a neoliberal shift. Somsook Boonyabancha, the brains behind Thailand's famed Baan Mankong upgrading programme, who was inspired by KIP, has strongly questioned the wisdom of promoting rusunawa.
5 Local governments steer rusunawa production and regulation, and (Figure 1 ). Silas believes the city's limited resources require prioritizing residents, since migrants can avail benefits in their hometowns. 8 This is what Fox (2014) decries as the misplaced 'anti-urbanization' policy bias that makes slums persist. Indeed, as evidence from Jakarta shows, depriving the poor of infrastructure like water and sanitation for lack of funds is pointless because they are willing to pay for those services, which also accrue long-term and citywide benefits (Crane, Daniere, & Harwood, 1997) .
Built Form: The KiP Legacy
A researcher at LPP explained 9 that it is not so much regulations and codes or their strict enforcement that have preserved the kampung, as it is a tacit understanding among Surabaya's policymakers, planners and kampung residents. Many local planners and policymakers (including the incumbent mayor) are LPP and ITS alumni. Therefore, the KIP-founders' philosophy of kampung-centred urban development (Silas, 2016 ) is deeply ingrained in Surabaya. Buildings in the kampung can rise three storeys; yet, lacking capacity or demand, most have just one or two. 10 Only recently have kampung buildings been growing bigger. Construction requires a city-issued building permit called the Izin Mendirikan Bangunan (IMB). It is issued upon the approval of the lurah and camat, upon the recommendation of the RW and RT heads, if neighbours consent. This localized collective approbation discourages indiscriminate or unsightly construction in kampung. Only the edges of kampung allow large retail or office buildings, proportionate in size to the roads they abut. Thus, even large commercial corridors shield dense, low-rise kampung (see Figure 2 , explained later).
The preservation of kampung in the heart of Surabaya's central business district (CBD) is a rare urban achievement. Deservedly then, two kampung near the CBD-Maspati and Ketandan-were showcased to PrepCom3 visitors in August 2016. These settlements exemplify how incremental self-improvement of homes follows the upgrading of community infrastructure-most houses here are at least two storeys tall; roads/paths are well-paved; trash receptacles are plentiful and residents contribute cash or labour for maintaining public spaces. An emerging planning challenge though is parking. Most internal lanes cannot accommodate the rising car ownership that now congests the main roads. Denser and poorer kampung that ring the CBD, like Keputran, disallow even riding motorcycles.
shelter and Livelihoods in Kampung
Central city kampung like Keputran traditionally housed migrant workers of the informal sector. Many worked in the nearby Pasar Keputran-the city's biggest wholesale night market for vegetables. 11 Even today, some trash collectors work and reside at the edge of Keputran, along Jalan Pandegiling, but most informal sector workers have been pushed out by the forced relocation of Pasar Keputran to the city's periphery and the crackdown on street vending in the core (Peters, 2009, p. 908) . Rents too are rising with demand fueled by the growing low-skilled legions of the neoliberal Indonesian city's bulging yet exploitative and precarious services sector. The conjuncture of economic crisis and sudden decentralization and democratization substantially rearranged the contours of local land, labour and housing markets, especially in the central city (Peters, 2010) .
The case of Fina, 12 a mother of two in her late thirties, illuminates some of these seemingly subtle but significant impacts. An Ambonese, she grew up in Surabaya with her uncle's family. After finishing an accounting diploma in 2005 from a local university, STIESIA, she began working in a nearby office. She continued to rent the same one-room arrangement (with a shared toilet) of the kos-boarding housewhere she had lived as a student for it was cheap (she spent over 40 per cent of her about USD 85 salary on rent). Like most boarders/renters in kos-kosan (a plural of kos), she almost always ate out-ubiquitous informal food vendors and eateries in kampung offer countless affordable options (anywhere from USD 0.3 to 1.0 for a meal). Fina moved away to Malang for 2 years after losing her job. In 2009, she returned to join an insurance company in Surabaya's CBD, and in 2011 joined a global hotels and vacations company. At both places she remained a contract worker-like most others in the services sector. After Malang, Fina briefly moved back to her old kos in Menur Pumupumgan, but poor public transportation and long 12-hour days forced her to move to Keputran. Also, her former landlord raised her rent. So, to be able to walk to work, she chose to pay the same higher rent (~USD 55) for a smaller room in congested Keputran. Among the mostly female migrant renters at her new kos, she was the odd local. A year or so later, pregnant, she married her boyfriend-a migrant employee at a pharmacy. Together they moved about 1 km west to a more affordable kos (for couples) in Tempel Sukorejo (1.5 rooms, no attached bathroom), where they still reside with their two children. Fina's story of having lived her entire adult life in kos-kosan is not atypical. Hoffman, Walker, Struyk and Nelson (1991) estimated a quarter of urban Indonesians to be single-room kos-kosan occupants. This form of informal renting, remarkable in its ranges of prices and options, is uniquely ubiquitous in kampung. Albeit significant poverty reduction since the 1990s, Indonesia's rapid economic growth has been jobless and inequitable (Martinez, Western, Haynes, Tomaszewski, & Macarayan, 2014) , with lowskilled employment becoming increasingly of inferior quality and non-standard. Moreover, Surabaya's galloping real estate development has raised residential property prices by 25 per cent annually (Manurung, 2013) , and inflation renders wages inadequate (Fadli, 2014) . Despite getting more formal sector urban jobs, migrants' economic mobility is worsening (Alisjahbana & Manning, 2010) .
Comprising different neighbourhoods, Nginden Jangukan is a kelurahan on central Surabaya's eastern edge (the part south-east of the intersection beside '4' in Figure 2 ). The traditional KIP-upgraded kampung area (inside the large dashed polygon, marked 1A) is organically evolved and much denser than the newer, planned housing (perumahan) to its east and south (2) . All the smaller dashed polygons indicate large commercial buildings (because it is along the widest and busiest road, the long continuous commercial strip to the west of 1A has the largest structures). Inside the traditional kampung 1A, all commercial buildings are on the northern edge. The proximate locations of UNTAG, a university (3), and the Bratang terminal (4) for mini-vans called bemo (the only public transportation) are representative of the central city's mixed land use. UNTAG and the Rungkut industrial area to the south-east make it a renters' paradise. The dotted line with arrows at the ends is Nginden Lane II; 1A's only through access for four-wheeled automobiles, this 1 km stretch has incredibly mixed uses. Almost each residential structure also hosts some commercial useinter alia shop, eatery, cafe, internet cafe, video rental, laundry, ambulance, carpenter, tailor, doctor, dentist, salon, baby-sitter, auto-mechanic and a futsal arena. There are several mosques, community spaces and a wet market. A long-time resident of Nginden Lane II recalled that in the1990s one in four houses had a kos, versus four out of five today (some with over 50 rooms). 13 As a young widow she was able to raise three children mainly by renting space in her house to migrants.
Compared to the CBD 5 km away, in Nginden kos rentals are cheaper and choices plentiful. Other than students and formal sector workers from eastern Indonesia, scores of itinerant pushcart vendors and trash collectors also find rents affordable (as low as IDR 350,000 14 per month) and space to park carts. Rooms can also be rented by the week. Moreover, some eateries, cafes and vendors operate round-theclock to make kampung like Nginden incredibly safe. This creates a uniquely sociable environment where the private and public, and economic and life spaces thrive together (see Figure 3) .
Non-rigid planning regulations encourage home-based enterprises in upgraded kampung, especially poorer ones like Kenjeran. Fishing and cracker (from fish and shrimp) production had been the mainstay of this largely Maduranese coastal settlement. But the modest homes mostly lacked the space for drying and processing these products. Yet, in characteristically kampung fashion, these activities spilled over onto the nooks, streets and lanes. Lately, fishing and related livelihoods have declined sharply but the influx of young workers in Surabaya's expanding services sector has fueled a kos-kosan boom. Figure 4 shows a new kos, with 10 one-room (with kitchenette and toilet) units (IDR 280,000 per month), on what was a banana patch 3 years ago. The 30-something landlady also owns the small shop across this kos and another neighbouring kos. 15 KIP boosted the live-work-earn environment of the kampung (Tipple, 2005) . Low-income migrants run many informal enterprises in kampung, and they reside in kos-kosan owned by Surabaya natives. Yet, official policy ignores this symbiotic relationship. In providing the poor access to shelter and livelihoods, Surabaya's kampung are admirably egalitarian and inclusive. However, unjustly and unjustifiably, the city's insouciance to its migrants makes its poverty alleviation efforts exclude those without KTP.
The impediments of/to Legality
The very poor often do not possess the KTP, which affords legality based on residency. Many low-income urban migrants likely possess KTP for their hometowns. Indonesia's circular migration (Hugo, 1982) discourages migrants from forgoing the original KTP. Surabaya mandates every migrant to obtain at least the temporary KIPEM, but the poorest informal sector workers have neither.
Obtaining a KTP is prohibitively tortuous. Most official business requires the KTP, which, in turn, requires the kartu keluarga (family card) or KK. Earlier a KTP had to be renewed every 5 years. The KTP carries detailed personal and residential information. So even a local change of address necessitates updating it, which requires an 'Intent to move' letter (to, approximately, where) from one's kecamatan office. But the process begins first with letters of introduction and approval from the RT and RW heads, and then the kelurahan head. The whole process is repeated in the new location. A researcher at ITS and her retired police officer husband spent over a month to update theirs when moving to another neighbourhood. Systemic corruption today is much less and there is no KTP fee. Yet, the tortuous process rarely evades bribes. Just to correct his misspelt name on the KTP, a university professor spent three unsuccessful weeks shunting across offices, before a USD 50 bribe got it done briskly. 16 For the poor then, getting a KTP imposes prohibitive opportunity costs.
The KTP or KIPEM gains access to subsidized state-provided services-primary education, community health centres (puskesmas), health insurance (askes/astek), social security/insurance system (jamsostek) and microcredit. Lacking access to credit is likely the worst deprivation. A construction supervisor (and a former kos-kosan boarder himself) who regularly hires labourers without KTP said that few poor migrants can borrow even from local arisan where they reside. 17 Thus, they borrow at exorbitant monthly interest rates from pawn shops (pegadaian) (~12 per cent), usurious private moneylenders (bank titil) (>5 per cent), also called blood-leeches (lintah darat) or individual lenders (dana talangan). The pawn shop is easiest because it just pawns a material asset like one's motorcycle. Comparing these rates to formal microfinance's (0.04-2 per cent) 18 underscores the injustice of KTP-bound eligibility.
The illegal Kampung
The strip marked '5' in Figure 2 , along Kali (river) Wonokromo, is a squatter community called Barata Jaya. Stretching a kilometer to its left are two similar settlements, Bratang Tangkis and Bratang Baru. Atop a flood-protection levee along the river, they straddle a path barely 1-2 m wide. Numbering about 1,600 households or 8,000 people, 13 such riparian settlements collectively call themselves the Strenkali (riverbank) communities (Taylor, 2015, p. 629) . Bratang Tangkis was first squatted in the 1950s (King & Idawati, 2010) ; squatting involved buying land illegally from the land mafia, the preman-local gangsters, with alleged state protection. 19 Multiple floors have now appeared with growing households and rental demand ( Figure 5 ). One home may house up to four households, and 600 households live in the aforementioned three communities.
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With nearly 450 households, Bratang Tangkis is the largest, oldest and most tenure secure. Many people now work formal jobs. In 1966, Bratang Tangkis got itself officially included in the adjacent kelurahan, but remained without services for long as its legal status is still murky. It now has an RW with 3 RT. Many residents, mostly migrants from around East Java, gradually acquired KTP. 21 Conversely, the Bratang Baru community, which abuts the city water supply station but has no services, is the newest, poorest and most vulnerable. It mainly expanded in the 1990s, although some sex workers and scavengers had lived here for decades (hence, likely stigmatized). Officially illegal, Barata Jaya too lacks RT/ RW. In this community of recyclers, many are municipal employees-cleaners and waste collectors. Indonesia's controversial transmigration programme (see Fearnside, 1997) had brought them temporarily to Surabaya. While awaiting movement orders, the late 1990s' political upheaval botched the relocation plan and stranded them permanently. Being unskilled, they began scavenging for the city, which deemed them illegal but let them squat.
For long factories and warehouses too occupied Surabaya's riverbanks 'illegally'. Riverbanks constitute a riparian buffer that belongs to the provincial or national government, 22 which makes squatting easier but providing services harder. Following an international consultant's proposal, in March 2002 this aspiring world city began evicting squatters and factories to reduce pollution and flood risk, and revitalize waterfronts (King & Idawati, 2010, p. 215) . Predictably, the city accused riverbank squatters of dumping untreated sewage and garbage. Just 3 days of demolitions left 1,150 households homeless, who were promised rehabilitation in rusunawa (p. 216). In May 2002, Bratang Tangkis and other settlements too received eviction notices. That spurred unprecedented shelter-focused, community-CSO collaboration for exemplary activism and interventions. An infant but radical local NGO, Jerit, aided by Uplink Surabaya, 23 organized the city's vulnerable poor into riverbank squatters (PPTS), street vendors (PKL), sex workers (PSK) and homeless children (Some, Hafidz, & Sauter, 2009) . Bratang Tangkis was integral to PPTS, which broke away in 2005 to form PWS (Paguyuban Warga Strenkali or Strenkali People's Movement), a squatters' CSO. By positioning them as the rivers' defenders, PWS has challenged the state's vilification of squatters. The absence of data easily undermines squatters' significant contribution to urban economies-a rare study estimates squatters' contribution to India's gross domestic product (GDP) at 7 per cent (PRIA, 2013) .
In 2002, PWS's precursors worked with a local environmental NGO (Ecoton) and Yogyakarta's Gajah Mada University to produce a technical study. It proved that squatters' contribution to river pollution was 15 per cent, four times less than factories' (Some et al., 2009) . For managing floods, pollution and riparian health, the state's proposal to remove structures within 12-15 m from the water would have demolished all riverbank settlements. So the same study suggested that communities voluntarily withdraw their structures 3-5 m away from the rivers, which would allow sufficient access but avert displacing 8,000 people. This compelling alternative was extensively disseminated, including through the media. The looming economic, social and political costs of displacement goaded the provincial government to urge a reluctant city to explore the alternative (Taylor, 2015) . In July 2002, the city commissioned LPP to survey targeted squatter communities to understand their preferences. The unanticipated findings revealed (Soemarno, 2010 ) that about 20 per cent squatters were from Surabaya, yet over two-thirds had Surabaya KTP (for some other address). A fifth opposed relocation (biggest choice), and not even 1 per cent wanted rusunawa flats.
According to PWS leader Pak Gatot, 24 far-flung rusunawa can never replicate: the webs of life, culture and social capital; the space and agglomeration that support livelihoods; and access to amenities. Furthermore, transportation costs and monthly rents, which are certain to increase, make poor households in rusunawa more financially precarious. So PWS only finds acceptable a three-pronged solution: (a) legalize communities' claim to land they occupy; (b) grant each community collective ownership; and (c) conduct participatory upgrading. Sustained negotiations saw sympathetic provincial government officials like Whisnu Sakti Buana eventually propose a new regulation (Perda) in 2007. It gave Strenkali communities 5 years to move structures back by 5 m, reorient them to face the river, and demonstrate the ability to manage waste and reduce pollution.
Since 2002, the Strenkali communities forged newer and stronger alliances with CSOs like Community Architects Indonesia (Arkom), transnational networks of the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR), as well as universities like Petra Christian. PWS's activism through news and social media drew national and international attention. During the 5 probationary years, ACHR, Arkom and Petra imparted PWS skills and technologies to harness latent community potential. Bratang Tangkis grew community savings to realign structures, pave the new access path and build individual toilets and septic tanks for all houses. It garnered formal water supply and proposed elevation design uniformity for aesthetics ( Figure 6 ). Sans effective leadership, Bratang Baru and Barata Jaya could not achieve as much.
Unfortunately, the provincial government's proposal was never acceptable to the city administration, and evictions resumed in 2009 (Taylor, 2015) . Ms Tri Rismaharini (Risma), the city's first elected woman mayor in 2010, is considered upright and development-minded. She came in assuring Strenkali residents tenure security and KTP (Taylor, 2015, p. 631) , but has done little for in situ upgrading or communitydriven resettlement. Instead, she has proclaimed more rusunawa (always unacceptable to Strenkali communities) but without expanding access to migrants (Das, 2016) . PWS leaders like Gatot and Santo lament that the Strenkali communities feel betrayed by the city. 25 They do not trust city officials anymore. Gatot added, ' We do not want relocation, we propose [in situ] renovation. We now have the skills and the knowhow. And we want to control and guide the development of the city.' PWS will oppose relocation even if the state were to let communities design their own habitats. Such requests have gone abegging in the past because the owners of sending and receiving lands rarely agree. Uncoordinated levels of government and discordant departments are emergent decentralization challenges. They believe that policymakers like Risma and Wisnu may have genuine intentions, but because squatter resettlement is perceived to discourage development investment, the Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah (SKPD)-various local government departments-refuse to cooperate. The latest demolition and eviction of another Strenkali community happened on August 12, 2016 , barely within a fortnight of PrepCom3. Ironically, when Surabaya was championing the 'inclusive city' at PrepCom3, it also forbade street vendors for miles around the venue.
Conclusions
This paper illustrates how Surabaya's tales of shelter and poverty are told in twos-about KIP and post-KIP phases; the upgrading of regular kampung versus illegal squatter settlements; and 'eligible' city residents and 'ineligible' migrants. The city has always attracted migrants from near and far. During the authoritarian New Order, Surabaya's local innovation, KIP, became an international paragon of in situ upgrading. Without targeting housing, KIP's extensive community-level infrastructure upgrading catalyzed, citywide, the housing stock in kampung. Not rigidly enforcing planning regulations and building codes, plus a tacit upholding of the KIP-founders' vision of kampung livability have fostered a unique symbiosis between locals and migrants. Yet, while poor migrants find refuge in kampung, not having a KTP denies them welfare services. Notwithstanding post-decentralization autonomy, Surabaya has not cast aside regressive KTP-based eligibility criteria for various services-a vestige of the New Order. The process of obtaining a KTP is still tortuous and can prove expensive, especially for poor migrants. Although much less restrictive, the KTP, nevertheless, imposes hardships similar to China's infamous hukou system that has sustained extensive social and spatial stratification, and fostered social discrimination and exclusion (Chan, 2009) . Recognizing their futility and follies, how China has relaxed its strident population control measures is especially instructive ('No riff-raff', 2015; 'Pity the children ', 2015) , as is an ambitious proposal like the 'intent to reside' concept in India to allow the so-called 'illegal' to access essential services by redefining urban residency (Bhan, Goswami, & Revi, 2014, p. 90) .
The city's support for pro-poor shelter projects has declined dramatically in the post-KIP phase. Prioritizing rental flats, rusunawa, as the only affordable shelter intervention is imprudent. Besides their meager supply and low scalability, they are insensitive to the livelihoods, social and economic networks, and cultural assets of the urban poor. These weaknesses, ironically, were the achievements of KIP upgrading. Moreover, rusunawa exclude those without KTP. The city's not maintaining or publicly sharing data on squatters makes them invisible to policy reform. However, state apathy has bolstered activism by new community-based CSOs like PWS, which has plugged riverbank squatter communities into powerful civil society networks. Disabusing stigmas, squatters have proven their potential to be effective stakeholders in sustainable, pro-poor shelter planning and design.
PWS and other CSOs are confident of changing official attitudes on urban citizenship and shelter. On social media theirs is a sophisticated discourse. A PWS member railed: 26 'The city treats us like garbage, but what gives it the right to do so? We belong to this city. We have built this city with the other citizens. We contribute essential services that the city depends upon!' Surabaya indeed ought to embrace its squatters and migrants, who are central to its economy. The city that realized KIP can also be a just and inclusive city. Fortunately, favourable factors such as a stable population, widespread social learning from past upgrading, an empowered squatter citizenry, skilled CSOs and promising political leadership make it attainable (Das, 2016; Taylor, 2015) . The political will to treat the city's willing squatters and capable CSOs as real stakeholders may just be what is missing.
